I was leaning in the non-EFS direction—which is to say, the direction of classic Trinitarian orthodoxy—but I was still ambivalent about it. In the months (and now two and a half years) that followed, though, I’ve landed firmly. And so I thought I’d write a post summarizing my position on the issue. 

It’s hard to believe that two and a half years have passed since the discussion concerning the eternal functional subordination of the Son took the evangelical blogosphere by storm in the Summer of 2016. Perhaps still more difficult to believe is that, with the veritable mountain of blog posts and articles written since then, I still get asked about this issue at least every other week.

The first post I wrote on the topic was my attempt to summarize the issues at play. I was just trying to get a handle on what was and was not being argued, and definitely felt like I needed to understand more before I came down on one side or the other. A few days later, I wrote a follow-up post pushing for clarity on some specific questions in the debate. And even though it had only been a few days, I could discern that I was leaning in the non-EFS direction—which is to say, the direction of classic Trinitarian orthodoxy—but I was still ambivalent about it.

In the months (and now two and a half years) that followed, though, I’ve landed firmly. And so I thought I’d write a post summarizing my position on the issue. I’ve become convinced that there can be no eternal relations of authority and submission ad intra, within the life of the Trinity from eternity, because (1) submission is the subjection of one will to another and therefore it requires multiple faculties of will; because (2) will is a property of nature, not person, and thus two wills require two natures; and (3) there is only one nature in the Godhead. There can be no submission or subjection within the Godhead ad intra without there being a distinction of nature. The reason the incarnate Son can submit to the Father (which, of course, everyone grants is the case) is because He has added a human nature (and thus a human will) to His divine nature, which He possesses in perpetuity (Col 2:9; cf. 1 Cor 15:28). Before He assumed a human nature in the incarnation, there is no subjection of the Son’s will to the Father. God is one God; each person of the Trinity fully subsists in the single, simple, undivided divine essence. Submission ad intra threatens the essential oneness of God.

That position depends on the truthfulness of the key premises in the previous paragraph: namely, that submission requires two faculties of will, and that will is a faculty that is properly predicated of a nature (of which there is only one in the Godhead), not a person (of which there are three in the Godhead). How can we go about proving the validity of these two premises?

The Nature of Submission

This debate consists in the discussion of eternal functional subordination (EFS), or eternal relations of authority and submission (ERAS), and so we have to be clear on what subordination and submission mean. Submission seems to be the more acceptable term even from the EFS guys, so I’ll focus on that.

In the first place then, it seems virtually tautological to say that submission entails the subjection of one will to another. That’s just what submission is. When we speak of submission, we ordinarily mean to convey the idea of the subjection of one will to another. If that’s too anecdotal for you, the Oxford English Dictionary defines submission as “the action of accepting or yielding to a superior force or to the will or authority of another person.” BDAG’s entries for hupotagē (submissiveness, subjection) and hupotassō (to submit) are consistent with this.

It is rather inescapable. For me to submit to someone is to subject my will to their will. And therefore, submission requires multiple faculties of will. If someone has submitted (Ha!) a compelling argument for why that’s not the case, I haven’t seen it.

Will is a Property of Nature, Not Person

“OK, so submission requires multiple wills. Why does that matter?” Well, since (a) will is a property of nature, not person, and since (b) there is only one nature in the Godhead, there can only be one faculty of willing in the Godhead, which makes submission impossible. “But how do we know that will is a property of a nature and not a person? If will is a property of person, then each person of the Trinity can have His own will, and submission makes total sense.”

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