I’ve argued elsewhere that social justice evangelicals employ certain socio-rhetorical devices, taken largely from the broader public discourse, that advantage them over their opponents. It is not just that these devices conceal a lack of reason; they are substitutes for reason; and they work best in civil public discourse. Civility is therefore not a sufficient condition to preclude all rhetorical advantages in public discourse. In this essay, I uncover one critical advantage enjoyed by the social justice advocates in evangelicalism.

Moral Impressions and Christianizing Devices

The social justice talk in evangelicalism is remarkable for the absence of systematic thinking on the pertinent questions of justice. One rarely encounters precise and detailed theories of justice and careful applications. Rather what we find is very similar to what Thomas Bradstreet identified in his article here on evangelical political theology. Evangelical moral reasoning is very much like their political theology. Rarely does their moral reasoning begin with moral principles and systems and then logically proceed to conclusions. Rather their thinking begins with an impression or reaction of goodness or badness; and then, as part of their moral thinking, they supply a broad principle, which serves only to christianize the impression. That is, the principle (or line), which I will also call the “christianizing device,” elevates the impression into Christian public morality. The actual moral conclusion or determination precedes the moral principle. So their reasoning has a two-step sequence:

1) Have a negative, moral reaction to something, a reaction that one is socialized to perform (perhaps on social media) upon encountering some event.

2) Christianize the moral impression by confidently stating an extremely broad principle or statement from the Bible (“love your neighbor”) or some other Christian-like statement without any attempt to make distinctions or qualifications or systematize or consider competing goods.

This moral thinking does not begin with a nuanced principle and then proceed to a moral conclusion. Rather the conclusion is already decided due to one’s moral socialization and the principle is subsequently supplied. The principle serves however not as a reason for the impression (though it publicly appears as a reason) but to elevate the moral impression or reaction into Christian public morality. The moral conclusion (viz. this is good, bad, or morally indifferent) is already determined inwardly (via socialization) quite apart from reason, and the christianizing device is the outward expression of that inward determination. But again the device does not actually function as the basis for the moral determination; rather it is the means by which that determination is brought into Christian morality.

This means that the basis of the evangelical leaders’ (and also their followers) moral determinations is not a consistent principle or even principles at all, and hence what one considers good, evil, or morally indifferent is ultimately an incoherent set of latent impressions waiting to be triggered by events. And since the principle is logically subsequent to the moral impressions, it doesn’t matter that it could justify practical absurdities. In other words, it is irrelevant that a consistent application of the principle would lead to all sorts of absurd outcomes, policies, actions, etc. For example, if one were to react to a restrictive immigration policy by affirming, without any distinctions or nuance, “the universal dignity of all people” or by saying that Christians ought to “love your neighbor,” then how can any immigration restriction or even the illegality of border crossing stand up to the demands of Christian morality? But the logical consequences of the supplied principle are irrelevant, because it doesn’t function in their reasoning as the determinate of their moral conclusions.

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