Molinism is a needlessly over-engineered attempt to shield God from His own sovereignty. By making divine decree dependent on human autonomy, its premise is as flawed as its implications. Molinism effectively destroys the efficacy of prayer, the security of hope, and the very aseity of God.

Consider the proposition P: If agent S is presented with choice X in circumstance C, S will form intention Y.

While both Calvinists (compatibilists) and Molinists agree that given P, S will inevitably intend Y, they diverge sharply on the nature of that inevitability.

For the Calvinist, Y not only will occur but must occur. This is because God has determined both the logical and causal structures of P, so that S can do no other than form intention Y. In other words, God has decreed the causal link between the circumstance and the agent’s intention. Here, God exerts exhaustive control over both what S would do (counterfactuals) and what S will do (actualities). Finally, because God decrees P itself, he could decree a different outcome in relation to the exact same state of affairs.

In Molinism, God’s control is indirect. P is not something that is decreed, but something God knows through “Middle Knowledge.” Accordingly, God does not control what S would do because such truths are independent of God’s will. God only controls what S will do, and he does so by choosing to actualize the specific circumstance (C) in which he knows S will form intention Y. Consequently, while C is a sufficient condition for Y, S retains the libertarian power to do otherwise. This means that God does not determine the intention of the heart. Rather, God permits the known outcome to manifest. In this framework, God cannot decree a different outcome given the identical state of affairs, for the outcome is grounded solely in the agent’s own free agency.

Similarities:

Despite these structural differences, the subjective experience of the agent remains identical in both systems. S never feels coerced, nor does S disapprove of the intention. Whether the intention is causally determined (Calvinism) or sovereignly permitted (Molinism), S identifies with the choice and approves of it upon consummation.

Ultimately, both views treat P as a contingent truth in that P is neither necessary nor impossible. In other words, it’s theoretically possible that S chooses otherwise.

Differences:

In Calvinism, the contingency of a free will choice is grounded in God’s sovereign ability to make P either true or false. Whereas in Molinism, P’s contingency is grounded solely in the agent’s autonomous freedom. In other words, in Calvinism God determines the truth value of P; whereas in Molinism, the uninstantiated essence anchors P’s truth value.

The divergence between these two views fundamentally alters what creative options God has at his disposal. The central distinction lies in the concept of “Possible Worlds” versus “Feasible Worlds.”

Calvinism: All Possible Creative Options

In Calvinism, God’s creative options are limited only by the laws of logic. Because God determines the causal relationship between a circumstance (C) and an intention (Y), he can decree any logically possible outcome. In other words, all possibilities are truly available to God to actualize. Therefore, God can actualize any possible world just as long as he can conceive it. This follows from the compatibilist premise that what an agent would do is a decretive truth. Accordingly, God does not discover such truths but rather decides them for his own purposes.

Molinism: Restricted Creative Options

In Molinism, God does not determine the free choices of men. Instead, God discovers what choices would be freely made through his eternal Middle Knowledge. They are the cards God must play if he desires to be in a personal relationship with his image bearers. Therefore, God’s creative options are limited not just by logic, but by the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom (CCFs) – those truths about what free agents would do in certain situations, which God knows (passively).

Possible vs. Feasible:

Although there are infinite possible worlds, in a Molinistic framework only a subset of them are feasible for God to create. For example, it might be logically possible for S to form intention Y in circumstance C, but if it is a contingent truth that S would actually form intention Y, then a world where S chooses according to ~Y is “infeasible” for God to actualize.

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