The consequences of his withdrawing his resignation I have mentioned above. The office of stated clerk would be reduced in effectiveness and esteem by doing so, and the PCA would be worse for it. Chapell would be put in an impossible position which he lacked the personal capital – the respect and confidence of others – to successfully perform, and the denomination would suffer internal tension and a loss of respect and of effective collaboration with other churches. Far from being good for him, the office of stated clerk, and the PCA, it would be detrimental to all parties.

As a general rule, resignations should not be withdrawn. Yet twice now men have suggested that Bryan Chapell withdraw his resignation as stated clerk of the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA); David Coffin to Chapell directly, and George Robertson by open letter to the PCA General Assembly. Both argue that Chapell resigning is an example of worldly cancel culture rearing its head in our midst. Coffin believes that Chapell didn’t lie in his scandalous statements – which is factually untrue – and that formal process should be followed to remove a stated clerk. Robertson believes Chapell’s offensive behavior was untypical for him, and that it would be a powerful example to “a culture accustomed to cancelation” to see the PCA’s “highest church court extending restorative forgiveness” by reinstating Chapell as stated clerk.

Their suggestion that Chapell withdraw his resignation is mistaken. One, they misunderstand the nature of the stated clerk. It is a provisional office occasioned by practical need – it was part-time in the PCA’s early years – and not a perpetual office like elder or deacon. It is purely administrative or clerical in nature. Judicial process is only prescribed in cases of alleged wrongdoing involving perpetual officers.[1] An administrative role like clerk is at the discretion of the court it serves.[2]  If this be doubted, I ask: where in the Book of Church Order (BCO) or Rules of Assembly Operations (RAO) does it say a clerk may not be requested to resign or not be removed except by formal process? Nowhere. A clerk serves at the pleasure of the court he serves, and this is another expression of one of the fundamental principles of our church and government, namely that it is representative (BCO Pref. II.2; 1-1). Office can be withheld or withdrawn by the authoritative body said office serves.

Now I ask, which is higher, a perpetual office or a provisional one? The former, clearly. And if the higher can be withheld (e.g., a church firing its pastor), how much more the lesser! In addition, administrative roles require a holder to have the confidence of the court that employees him, and of the people that court serves. The PCA’s stated clerk must have the confidence of the vast bulk of the entire denomination, including especially its leaders: as the formal qualifications put it, “he must be able to work in a capable, sensitive manner with persons who are in positions of responsibility in the Presbyterian Church in America organization structure” (RAO 3-5f).  He must also have the respect and confidence of those in other particular branches of the one church of Christ, and thus “be able to work with the leaders of all branches of this true Church” (3-5h). Chapell has indisputably forfeited his confidence with many both within the PCA and without.

Robertson and Coffin seem to think that asking and receiving forgiveness enables Chapell to be restored as stated clerk. But they forget that repentance given and forgiveness received do not necessarily commend, much less mandate official restoration. In fact, in cases of serious wrong involving a minister, restoration to office is rare and generally ill-advisable, and it is granted only in exceptional cases after repentance has been proven over an extended period of time (BCO 34-8; 37-8). Our constitution actually mandates suspension from office in cases of serious wrong, even where confession of fault is made, and irrespective of “however penitent he [the offender] may appear to the satisfaction of all.” In such a case “the court shall without delay impose definite suspension or depose him” (BCO 34-7). The examples it gives are in matters “base and flagitious, such as drunkenness, uncleanness…” Now God groups drunkenness and uncleanness with false witness and slander as works of the flesh (Matt. 15:19; comp. Gal. 5:19-21); i.e., as of the utmost severity. And if slander is so severe that a minister must be deposed or suspended for it (assuming we are consistent), would it be prudent for a clerk entrusted with the entire denomination’s administrative affairs to be retained if he commits it? It would seem that, insofar as the clerk must deal with enormous of numbers of people in the PCA, and, further, slander being a relationship-upheaving sin, its actual detriment to decency and good relationships and the confidence of others is much more significant than if Pastor A of a church with 22 members gets drunk and is charged on that account. And again, if the higher – which unlike the lower has rights that make it impeachable only on cause – must be suspended or deposed in such cases, it ought not to be unthinkable that the lower would be as well.

Elsewhere Coffin and Robertson appeal to Chapell’s long record of service as commending his continuance. But past performance is no guarantee of present fitness. And when one does a great public wrong – as Chapell himself admits he did – that past streak of faithfulness is marred, and his present character is called into question or proved to have worsened such that he who was once fit is such no longer. Solomon was the wisest of men, ruled over Israel at the height of its ancient glory, and wrote inspired scripture, yet he stumbled in his later years and thereby cost his dynasty most of the kingdom as a consequence (1 Kgs. 11:31-39).

But these matters are subordinate, as it were, and entail Robertson and Coffin in misunderstandings of the stated clerk’s nature and purpose, and of the proper circumstances for judicial process. The gist of the matter boils down to two heads. One, they exaggerate the effects upon Chapell of resigning. Chapell is not being ‘canceled’ personally, as so many of the victims of secular cancel culture, who have seen their reputations and fortunes ruined utterly. Chapell will still be a teaching elder, as he has not been charged in that capacity (as far as is publicly reported at this time), and can still fulfill the functions of that higher office. He has merely resigned one temporary, clerical position – and that of his own volition – that is technically elected to a one year term (RAO 4-9),[3] and has done so on account of a serious fault that he has publicly and privately confessed.  By way of contrast, many of the victims of cancel culture are deprived of position and more against their wills, and in many cases on account of unjust and untrue accusations. Their cases are not analogous to Chapell’s. It might also be added that loss of position – call it cancelation if you must – is sometimes appropriate, and that this is one of those cases.

Two, a canceled resignation is a cancelation too, and it would cancel the desires of very many people in the PCA and in the wider church, including many elders, the administrative committee, and, quite probably, some of those whom Chapell offended. Coffin and Robertson exaggerate the baleful effects on Chapell personally, but in so doing forget the rights and desires of a great multitude of sheep and of the church as corporate institution. For the sake of one man not being ‘canceled’ as regards a single, temporary, clerical position, they are prepared to trammel the understandable objections of the many. In so doing they effectively suggest that we should cancel the representative nature of our government, and the proper consequences of public wrong (loss of position); and surely, if cancelation be a great evil, it is greater to cancel these things than to deprive one man of a clerical role to which he is not entitled by right.

However well-intended, their ideas on this point are imprudent and unhelpful. Laying aside the enormous practical difficulty that Chapell has already resigned and his resignation has been accepted, what do such men think would happen if Chapell reneged? He would destroy his credibility with a massive number of people, draw into question the sincerity of his apologies, and greatly hamper his personal effectiveness as both elder and clerk, as well as create both internal and external difficulties for the PCA. There are many people in both leadership and the pews who believe that the PCA is run by an old-boys network (or series of them), and that this old-boys network is more interested in protecting its members and keeping up good appearances than in doing what is in the best interests of the church. They would say further that process is something that is used to shield the members of the in crowd when they do wrong, and that this old-boys network is not necessarily confined within the PCA as such but includes members of other entities. I don’t fully subscribe to that view, but there are many who do, and it has been a recurrent theme in the correspondence I receive.

And when Coffin and Robertson put such a valiant (dare we say, quixotic) effort into pulling Chapell’s resignation out of the deep, iron tight maw of ecclesiastical political momentum, it certainly invites suspicion on that point. In any event, those who think we are run by an old boys network, or at least that we are generally ineffective and poorly run, would either raise a terrible ruckus or head-for the exits if Chapell were to withdraw his resignation. Probably one of the first things some of them would do would be to follow Coffin’s lead and formally charge Chapell with wrong, which would entail all the distraction of an investigation and trial, and actually be worse for him (esp. if convicted) than just letting him resign.

However that may be, the consequences of his withdrawing his resignation I have mentioned above. The office of stated clerk would be reduced in effectiveness and esteem by doing so, and the PCA would be worse for it. Chapell would be put in an impossible position which he lacked the personal capital – the respect and confidence of others – to successfully perform, and the denomination would suffer internal tension and a loss of respect and of effective collaboration with other churches. Far from being good for him, the office of stated clerk, and the PCA, it would be detrimental to all parties.

On the other hand, Chapell can retain his resignation and the General Assembly can elect a new stated clerk, and life will go on peacefully for all parties. Chapell will still be a teaching elder. He will have set a good example of selflessness, sincerity, honor, and moral fortitude by apologizing publicly and privately, and by recognizing the gravity of his error and its effects by resigning his post. The General Assembly and Administrative Committee will renew confidence that we take public scandal seriously and will deal with it meaningfully, and that no one is above suffering the consequences of his actions. They can pursue mending relations internally and with other denominations, as well as give full attention to the many other things confronting them now. As such, I would heartily recommend that the General Assembly not follow Robertson’s suggestion to extend a request to Chapell that he withdraw his resignation. It would be in the best interests of everyone, including Chapell, to lay this matter to rest, and for the assembly to adamantly refuse to consider anything that would tend to renew it.

Tom Hervey is a member of Friendship Presbyterian Church in Laurens County, SC. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not of necessity reflect those of his church or its leadership or other members. He welcomes comments at the email address provided with his name. He is also author of Reflections on the Word: Essays in Protestant Scriptural Contemplation. 

[1] Obviously members are subject to it as well, but perpetual officer and member are the only two categories of member that the PCA recognizes and that are subject to judicial action. Something like clerk (or secretary or treasurer) is more a role or position, not an office in the strict, proper sense that deacon or elder is an office. In other words, as a church doesn’t have to follow a judicial process to fire its groundskeeper (though it would in order to excommunicate him), so also does judicial process apply to a clerk insofar as he is an elder, but not insofar as he is a clerk.

[2] The BCO says only that “a clerk or clerks shall be elected by the Session, Presbytery, and General Assembly to serve for a definite period as determined by the court” (10-4) and shall preserve and disseminate records appropriately.

[3] Rubber stamp reelection of the stated clerk has been the norm in past, but is certainly not mandatory.