It is this “norm,” the norm of God’s character — a norm that cannot be ignored — that can help us understand something of the pervasive effects of evil. Here, then, is the first truth about evil and suffering. Evil and suffering are the consequences of a violation of God’s holy and righteous character. Many children learn this at an early age. Question 14 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism asks and answers this: “Q. 14. What is sin? A. Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God.”

In my last article, I hinted at one way that a Christian could respond to the “problem of evil.” The problem, we will remember, is a distinctly Christian problem. As it is often charged, the problem has to do with the existence of the Christian God and the tremendous amount of evil and suffering in the world.

This does not mean, of course, that only Christians have a problem with suffering and evil. The opposite is the case. Every system of thought, and every individual, has to give some account of the problem of evil. Even Richard Dawkins, who wants to convince us of an atheistic world, nevertheless, has to incorporate some view of evil and suffering into that presumed world. For Dawkins, the world is one of “pitiless indifference,” so the problem of evil is no real problem; it is simply a product of blind and merciless forces.

Last time I highlighted the problem in terms of “compatibility.” As it is typically posed, there is a deep and abiding incompatibility between God’s character and the character of evil such that one of the two “existences” just doesn’t make sense. And since evil is so obvious and omnipresent, it stands to reason that we should give up our belief in the existence of God.

Dawkins’ atheistic worldview doesn’t suffer from such a malady. He has no Christian God in his belief system, so he simply relegates the problem of suffering to the “pitiless indifference” of his sad and lonely world. One of the problems with this way of attempting to address the issue, however, is that it is so personally, philosophically, historically and socially naïve. Notice how he puts it:

The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation…In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.

This is personally naïve because, as I noted in an article here last March, Dawkins himself makes pronouncements on suffering and evil that cannot support his “pitiless indifference” system. It is philosophically naïve because the problem, for a few thousand years, has evoked anything but indifference. It is historically naïve because it ignores the almost inexhaustible literature that the problem has produced. And it is socially naïve because it pretends that our global systems of justice are nothing more than a pitiless waste of time. To put it mildly, it would be difficult to imagine a position that was more out of touch with the way things really are than the one Dawkins supposes. Dawkins’s hope, no doubt, is that he can put forth a view that both negates Christianity and that supports his own Darwinian view. What it does, however, is show Dawkins’ own position (and not suffering and evil) to be a figment of his own imagination.

There are hints of the illusory character of Dawkins’ position embedded in his statement to the contrary. Why, for example, to use his own words, think that “some people are going to get lucky”?  What does it mean for one to be “lucky” in a universe of pitiless indifference? Dawkins might say that it means that some, for no reason whatsoever, get to avoid the suffering that others have to endure. But, clearly, this has to mean that it is better to avoid such suffering. And how can one make sense of what is “better” in the midst of cosmic indifference?  By definition, “indifference” is devoid of value judgments such as “better” or “worse.”

In other words, embedded in even the most extreme systems that try to incorporate the reality of suffering and evil is some kind of norm against which suffering and evil are seen to beabnormal. And this is as it should be; it is as it must be, unless one wants to (with Dawkins) build such an illusory world that, literally, no one can or does inhabit it (not even Dawkins himself).

It is not the case, as Dawkins states above, that “some people are going to get hurt,” and he knows that. It is rather the case, as he previously states, that the amount of suffering is “beyond all decent contemplation.” It is not that some get hurt. Everyone gets hurt, at various times, for long periods of time, and in multiple ways, until, finally, death. This is, then, a universalproblem of incalculable proportions. It is a problem that everyone faces, and so it needs a proper response.

That proper response is the Christian response. Those who know the Christian response are not, thereby, relieved of all pain and suffering; neither are we given all of the answers that we might hope for. But it may help us, and others who are outside of Christ, to remember, and as we have opportunity, to communicate the following truths:

1. There is a deep-seated and virtually ineradicable sense in every person that suffering and evil are not “normal.” From Mary Baker Eddy’s proposal that evil is an illusion, to Dawkins’ notion that it entails a lack of “luck,” the abnormality of evil and suffering is ever-present. Why is this? It’s not because suffering and evil are only marginal aspects of our daily lives. Suffering permeates our lives like the ticking of the clock; every second includes it, and future days on the calendar portend it. It is, in terms of our daily experience, and the experiences of all we know, and anyone we know of, constant. So, in the face of our universal, everyday experiences, we know that suffering and evil are not the way things ought to be. But this knowledge cannot be based on our empirical experience.

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