In 1 Corinthians 6 we read of the lamentable matter of fellow believers calling one another before the magistrate over unspecified “grievances”.1

For reasons we can only suppose,2 the church members preferred the civil courts over ecclesiastical regulation.

Paul’s distress over the Corinthians’ serial litigiousness, their inability to adjudicate and the chosen civil venue is clear. His incisive response to their practices and flawed ethic has informed both Christian opinion and related interpretative discussions. Due to his guarded style of inquiry,3 however, clear answers regarding the limitations and the real world application of his ethic do not fall easily to hand.

Does the shame mentioned in verse 5 lie in the fraternal litigation itself, the motivation or perhaps the triviality of the cases? Are Christians never to seek civil litigation? Is the regulation inter-Christian only?

If civil litigation is allowed, under what circumstances might it be invoked? Are Christians forbidden to protect their interests? The following brief investigation offers clues from the text which may be of help in defining the limits of the Pauline regulation.

The shameful conduct is defined, first of all (and in truth further aggravated), by the fact that these disputes are not even serious in nature, but trivial. The Apostle asks them in 2b, as future judges of the cosmos, “Are you not capable of [judging] the most trivial cases?” The adjective found here is the superlative form of mikrÒj, meaning “the smallest”. Paul expects the believers in Corinth to settle such embarrassingly small squabbles outside of the civil courts.

Arguing from the greater to the lesser, he appeals to their sense of shame by accentuating the dissonance found between their future cosmic role and their present behavior. Important to note in this first section of our passage is that he wishes to impress upon the hearers the unessential nature of the litigation. He repeats, and thereby underscores, this characteristic in verses 3 and 4. The litigants’ concerns are described twice as biwtik£ and biwtikὰ…krit»ria, “everyday matters of this life.”

Paul’s directive to the church is clear: The church should not be taking common and trivial matters before the magistrate. The shame, then, is not in the litigation itself (the grievances, though small, are not imagined).4 The focus of Paul’s criticism is that they have not found among themselves the capacity to try even trivial matters. The civil cases are the secondary, undesirable outcome of this central malady.

If this is indeed the case, then it would follow that Paul might allow a Christian to be engaged in litigation involving a more significant grievance, which exhausts the capacity of the church to adjudicate, or falls outside of its juridical purview. In the latter case, Paul’s life appears to bear this out. In Acts 16:19-40, we read of Paul’s unjust beating and imprisonment in Philippi. Here he insists (after the fact) upon his rights as a Roman citizen, which invokes quaking fear (and an apology!) from the magistrates.

In similar fashion, when threatened with a scourging in Acts 22:24f., Paul quickly argues the same case to good effect.5 In both instances, Paul identifies the culpable behavior of his adversaries with the adjective ἀkatakrίtoj, “without due process or trial.” He identifies, even in the corrupt Roman legal order, a process that serves a righteous end.

Indeed, he sees the civil authority as appointed by God and a hedge against evil-doing, Rom. 13:1-7.6 Later in his ministry, a quick-minded appeal to Roman law led to an extended court case with the Jewish authorities (attended by imprisonment) in Caesarea.

In the end, Paul demanded that it be justly shown what he had done wrong, either towards the Jewish nation or against Rome [Acts 25:6-12]. In this pagan court it was decided that Paul was innocent of the various charges brought against him.7 It appears that Paul did not seize upon litigation due to fear of persecution or punishment (v.12), but rather consequently insisted upon a court judgment that was consistent with the truth. It is not unreasonable, then, for a Christian, when confronted with false charges, to seek a genuine process of trial, where the assumed outcome is the discovery of truth. In all such cases, the Christian must be prepared, as with Paul, to endure the outcome of such proceedings.8

These observations, to be sure, have been drawn from Paul’s contact with non-Christian and pagan authorities. They were not an example of brother against brother, and could not have taken place in the church, for there was no ecclesiastical mechanism for such legal process, then as now. In such cases, it seems clear that the believer is free to access the civil courts, with the proviso that such litigation is undertaken with an eye towards justice and the establishment of truth. But are there provisions to try even serious matters in the church?

It appears that cases, both great and small, were being settled within the walls of the church. We may assume that Paul would have insisted upon the rapid dispatch of superfluous and trivial cases, per his reasoning in 1 Cor. 6:1-6. It cannot be assumed, however, that he would have made dispatch of the truth, or declare more serious matters as adiaphorous.

Indeed, he boldly pronounces judgment on the evildoer according to his sin in absentia, and calls upon the Corinthians to expel him from their fellowship (1 Cor. 5:1-6). Paul reasons here that such behavior carries consequences for the fellowship which cannot and should not be handled by dismissing the case. It is the duty of the church to confront and restore the brother who stumbles (Gal. 6:1), always acknowledging that the evildoer stands before the impartial judgment of Christ (Col. 3:24).

Paul’s assumption is that the churches will agree at some fundamental level as to what constitutes sin or inappropriate behavior,9 and then act according to love10 and a humble spirit to correct those who stumble (Gal. 6). It was not, then, the practice of Paul to ignore a matter of spiritual consequence; the church was expected to adjudicate the cases which came to her attention, great and small. Adding to this his displeasure of the Corinthians’ preference for the civil court, it is a logical and axiomatic norm of the church to begin and end all litigation within her walls.

We have not considered, however, cases which, as mentioned above, exhaust the church’s juridical capacity (legal expertise). Nor have we asked the question of jurisdiction when the church fails to exercise self governance and discipline.

Even more severe in its implications: what is to be done when a church or church member has violated civil law, and remains unrepentant? It is common practice that churches, when in need of professional legal services such as the generation of deeds, acquisitions or sales requiring legal documentation, marriage licenses, etc., turn to the civil authorities.

This includes, of course, legal counsel. The motivation here is not to bypass ecclesiastical regulation, but to secure legal services in accordance with the law.

Likewise, if a matter of dispute cannot be decided in a church court (including the process of mediation, where applicable) due to an intractable division of opinion, then the church has no choice but to seek out the civil courts if an equitable conclusion is to be achieved.

Paul nowhere assumes that the grievances, petty or great, are to be allowed to continue ad infinitum or dismissed by default. Only a genuine and equitable resolution can restore the peace of the church.

More difficult are the cases where the church has done nothing to resolve a grievance, or has in some way made itself culpable under civil law. These are generally serious matters, not to be confused with the everyday tussles treated in 1 Cor. 6:1-6. The court case would then be brought from the injured church member against the church or its members. Such cases are sadly the subject of recent headlines, where innocent parties have been financially defrauded, spiritually manipulated or even sexually abused.

The reason for the ensuing court cases? Certainly some have been unjust and superfluous, and reflect the unsavory litigious spirit of Corinth. Others, to be fair, occur due to the legal corporate status of some church entities, which require civil adjudication. And a few cases, to be truthful, reflect the church’s inability or unwillingness to confront her sins and mistakes, thereby engendering a number of genuine victims with legitimate grievances.

An appeal in such cases to the peace of the church, or, as in our passage, v. 7, “to overlook” these sins, makes light of the matter of sin and its consequences. When the church abdicates her responsibilities, coddles sin or condones unrighteousness, her violated members must turn elsewhere for truth and justice.

But is this allowed by Paul? The Apostle turns from the trivial matters of verse 1-6 and simultaneously raises the stakes by asking why the believers do not simply “allow themselves to be treated with injustice (ἀdikeῖqe)?” “Why not, yet the more, to be defrauded (ἀpostrereῖsqe)?”

This manner of argumentation, so familiar in Paul, assumes that the previously mentioned trivial cases, fraught with selfish concerns, are to wither in significance in light of the suffering of injustice (and all that this might imply). In contrast to their petty disputes, Paul introduces the weighty matter of genuine suffering and significant loss. He poses a sincere question, which certainly opens the possibility for the believer “to overlook” (and we assume forgive) even such grievous personal harm as the words imply.

Note that here, as with the rest of our passage, he simply poses a question to the suffering believer; it is not, as popularly assumed, a command from the Apostle. There is no indication that this question should be the foundation for dismissal of all inter-Christian grievances, or a prohibition against all civil litigation.

The question is posited, as with other rhetorical questions in Paul, to engender appropriate attitudes and behaviors, not to eliminate the possibility of righteous litigation. In spite of this it remains a legitimate goal for a Christian to appeal to this ethic in the face of injustice or wrongs committed.

It is a praiseworthy Christian ideal, often executed with the highest of virtue and at great personal cost. It is illegitimate, however, for believers to call upon this text to embolden acts which are unjust or result in others’ loss. The verse is directed solely to those who have been treated with injustice or have been defrauded.

An exegesis which allows appropriation of Paul’s ethic for personal gain is nothing more than presumption and arrogant self-indulgence, the very things against which the Apostle is reasoning. Indeed, we are sternly warned that such behavior involves more than personal loss; it invites divine retribution [v.9].11

After challenging his hearers to rise above their pettiness and consider a higher ethic of suffering, Paul issues a stinging indictment in v. 8: “But you (emphatic) work injustice and defraud, and this, even to your own brothers.”

This is an astonishing state of affairs.12 Here our passage resembles the warnings found in James 5.13 In James, those who defraud the believers are rich “outsiders” who face a withering catena of judgment images; in Paul, those who work unrighteousness and defraud are Christian brothers, who, if they persist in their behavior, can expect the loss of the inheritance of the kingdom of God [v. 9a]: “Do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God?”

The warning reflects a stereotypical pattern found within Paul, which, after having identified a sin, then answers it with a formulaic reminder of God’s perspective.14 We can assume, from Paul’s words, that unrighteousness15 in all its forms was the overarching rubric lying behind the church’s various conflicts, including the vexing juridical cases.

This backdrop of unrighteousness is bound to disrupt not only the normal operations of the church, but her attempts to regulate disputes, whether inside or outside the confines of her walls. Indeed, it appears that the most fundamental question/problem is not, in the end, the location of the court venue (unrighteousness destroys both). The problem lies in appropriating litigants who allow for a just and equitable outcome.

The Pauline ethic, which always has a corporate aspect, is here intensely personal. The individuals involved in the court cases determine the outcome of the matter, and sadly, this can be to the disadvantage of the many.16

1 The Greek word here is a common term which is generically translated as “matter, thing, incident”, but also may intimate an adversarial matter such as a dispute or a law-suit.
2 The church at Corinth was beset with a variety of sins, too many to list here. Paul’s rhetorical question as to whether there was no one wise enough to adjudicate a case is not a genuine indicator of the problem, rather a reflection of their party spirit and unwillingness, in most things, to be regulated by love and righteousness. In such an environment, it may well have been that the civil courts offered a more equitable solution. This would go a long way towards explaining the depth of shame which Paul himself reflects in this appeal.
3 Paul’s instruction here does not include a single command, but consists of a catena of rhetorical questions, which are primarily answered in yes or no; the exceptions are v. 4 and 7, which demand a considerate response as to why they go before the magistrate, and why they should not suffer wrong. It appears that the Apostle is expecting his hearers to formulate their ethic along the lines of their inner motivation (pure or corrupt), and ultimately, in light of God’s judgment, v. 9f.
4 Calvin distinguishes between law-suits and the passions which corrupt them: “Let us therefore bear in mind, that Paul does not condemn a law-suit on the ground of its being a wrong thing in itself to maintain a good cause by having recourse to a magistrate, but because it is almost invariably accompanied with corrupt dispositions; as, for example, violence, desire for revenge, enmities, obstinacy, and the like.” John Calvin, Commentary on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, vol. 1 (Baker: Grand Rapids, 2005), 205.
5 Here Charles Hodge agrees: “…Paul himself did not hesitate to appeal to Caesar to protect himself from the injustice of his countrymen.” Charles Hodge, An Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians (New York: R. Carter & Bros., 1860), 97.
6 Calvin insists that the magistrate is a God-ordained organ for our good, John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. F.L. Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 4.20.17.
7 These are characterized in v. 7 as barέa aἰtiώmata…ἅ oὐk ἴsχoun ἀpodeῖxai, “serious charges which they could not prove.”
8 Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.18, insists that “…if it is a civil case, a man does not take a right path unless he commits his cause, with innocent simplicity, to the judge as public protector; and he should think not at all of returning evil for evil [Rom. 12:17], which is the passion of revenge.”
9 In general terms, Paul tends to reference the Torah, in particular the Decalogue, along with numerous citations from Deuteronomy, i.e., Dt. 25:4 in 1 Cor. 9:9f., the regulation of wages in the Christian mission.
10 Calvin, Commentary, 206, insists that all matters, the believer must “…take heed that he does not bring into court any desire of revenge, any corrupt affection of the mind, or anger, or, in fine, any other poison. In this matter, love will be the best regulator.” In his footnotes, he poetically exclaims, “We must be adorned with true love.” In Institutes, 4.20.21, Calvin puts it so beautifully, that it merits a longer citation, “To sum up, love will give every man the best counsel. Everything undertaken apart from love and all disputes that go beyond it, we regard as incontrovertibly unjust and impious. For this must be a set principle for all Christians: that a lawsuit, however just, can never be rightly prosecuted by any man, unless he treat his adversary with the same love and good will as if the business under controversy were already amicably
settled and composed.”
11 Calvin, Commentary, 207f., does not overlook the severity of Paul’s words to those who would make the “sacred brotherhood a matter of no moment.” The unrighteous are characterized as “…those who inflict injury on their brethren, who defraud or circumvent others, who, in short, who are intent upon their own advantage at the expense of injuring others, will not inherit the kingdom of God.”
12 Calvin, Commentary, 207, does not overlook the matter: “Here is another aggravation of the evil; for if those are doubly culpable who defraud strangers, it is monstrous for brother to be cheated by brother.”
13 Although Paul’s apostolic regulation of believers’ behavior regarding litigation is significantly different from that found in the second and fifth chapters of the book of James, there is a connection between the two which should not be overlooked before at this point in our examination of 1 Cor. 6. The rich, who cut a pretty poor figure in James, are described as those who have “defrauded” the poor, 5:1-6. It is probably not insignificant that James uses the same verb (ἀposterέw) here, which Paul selects in our passage to describe the believers’ culpable activity. The meaning in James and our passage is the same: to steal by deception or defraud by denial of goods or justice.
14 The formulation, ἠ oὐk oἶdate ὅti is common in Pauline argument, and indicates a summary warning
statement as in the cases: Rom. 6:16,11:2; 1 Cor. 5:6, 6:2, 6:3, 6:9, 6:16, 6:19, and 9:13. It also has an inceptive use, however, seen in 1 Cor. 3:16 and 9:24.
15 Paul explicates the breadth of unrighteousness in v. 10, enumerating several of the vices found here and in other such lists in the corpus paulinum.
16 Calvin, as a trained lawyer, is acutely aware of the problem. At several points, he registers dismay at the prospect of finding righteous litigants, and, interestingly, with Paul, includes a list of vices which corrupt the litigant and the judicial process. He admits, Institutes, 4.20.17, that here are “two kinds of men” to be found in court, the righteous, who is “prepared to yield his own and suffer anything [rather] than be carried away with enmity toward his adversary” and those who “carry on their lawsuits with bitter and deadly hatred, and an insane passion to revenge and hurt…to the ruin of their adversaries.” With the presence of the latter, he laments that “…the whole court action of even the most just cause cannot but be impious.” He admits, Institutes 4.20.18, that a loving litigant is rare, and that “Perhaps someone will interpose here that such moderation in so uniformly absent from any lawsuit that it would be a miracle if any such were found. Indeed, I admit that as customs of these times go, an example of an upright litigant is rare; but the thing itself, when not corrupted by the addition of anything evil, does not cease to be good and pure. But when we hear that the help of the magistrate is a holy gift of God, we must more diligently guard against its becoming polluted by our fault.”

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