Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Reformed theology is its doctrine Of God’s Eternal Decree. Whereas Rome and Protestant denominations can find substantive agreement on the Person of Christ, Theology Proper, and with varying degree formal agreement on the sacraments – when it come to the Reformed doctrine Of God’s Eternal Decree Trinitarian communions are on a collision course. Indeed, one’s understanding of the divine decree will inform one’s understanding of free will, moral accountability, the fall of man, providence, faith and repentance, and more. This doctrine, also, has profound pastoral implications in a world of sin and suffering. We can’t afford to get this doctrine wrong.

It has been my contention for many years that the doctrine of God’s eternal decree is widely misunderstood, even unwittingly denied, within the Reformed tradition. Having served on a pastoral search committee in the OPC and candidates and credentials team in the PCA at the presbyterial level, I’ve seen a fair share of candidates for licensure, ordination and pastoral calls not be able to distinguish themselves from Molinists when it comes to the decree of God. My experiences that inform my conclusion go beyond serving in those capacities. That is to say, I believe my concerns are considerably informed on this matter. In an effort to get others to perhaps share my concern, so that maybe a small sphere of influence might gain heightened awareness, I have surveyed the theology of four commentaries spanning 150 years on an essential portion of the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF), specifically WCF 3.2 (hereon referred to as 3.2). Below I offer observations by way of comparison. I believe the one contemporary commentary on 3.2 distinguishes itself from the other three commentaries and is, I believe, representative of the general understanding of the doctrine of the divine decree in the Reformed church today.

The first two commentaries were written and published in the mid 1800s. The third was first published in 1964, so it’s relatively new (though nearly sixty years old). The final commentary is from this century, published in 2014. I find striking similarities between the first three regarding their respective interpretations of 3.2 as well with their emphases. Whereas the contemporary commentary is, I believe, more than a bit troubling with respect to theological and philosophical concepts, and the subsequent doctrine put forth. The doctrine put forth not only overlooks the distinctly Reformed points of the other three, it actually opposes them.

Before we get to the commentaries, it might be a useful exercise to just ask yourself what would it take for someone to convince you that he embraced a Reformed view of the divine decree? What diagnostic questions might you ask to tease out what one believes on this matter? Or more simply considered, how would you distinguish a Reformed theology of the decree from a non-Reformed Christian theology of the decree? Because it might come as a surprise, Molinists (which for our purposes are very sophisticated Arminians) believe God is sovereign and that by decreeing whatsoever comes to pass has foreordained all of history. Perhaps surprising to most, non-Reformed theology makes room for statements such as:

God has a purpose for all that occurs. In fact, God hasn’t just allowed evil in the world, God has sovereignly decreed a world with evil, but God will use it for his own glory. Indeed, God could have brought into existence (or actualized) any number of possible worlds, as his choices were truly infinite, but God was pleased to sovereignly decree this one. In accordance with God’s decree some were chosen in Christ and predestined according to the purpose of God’s will.
—Hypothetical Confession

As you might gather, other traditions can on the surface offer very attractive forms of God’s sovereignty and human freedom. With that observation comes a significant takeaway. It’s inadequate to consider such a generic confession of the divine decree as sufficiently Reformed. The question is, what is meant by certain words and phrases, and what key features, if any, are absent? Words and phrases like predestined, elect, chosen, and predeterminate counsel, are plainly put forth in Scripture. So much so, Calvinists and non-Calvinists cannot avoid incorporating them into their discourse. Consequently, it’s not very informative for one to say she believes God is sovereign, or that “God has a purpose in all of this”. Even the phrase “It was God’s will that this happened” does not disclose what one believes about God’s will. Much of what is written and spoken today by confessing Calvinists about God’s decree, providence and electing grace is insufficient to convict or acquit one on the charge of Calvinism.

There is a vast difference between (a) God having allowed something to occur that he could have prevented and (b) God having determined that something occur. Both ideas entail God’s sovereign will, but only the second explicitly puts forth a Reformed picture of the divine decree. The Reformed and non-Reformed can agree on the first expression of God’s will and sovereignty, but not on the second one.

Our key passage in the Westminster standards:

Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet has He not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.
—3.2

Regarding 3.2, Robert Letham notes:

Both Helm and Fesko correctly identify Molinism as the target of the final clause. Following Luis de Molina (1535-1600), this was the proposition that God’s decrees were based on his knowledge of all possible future actions.*
—The Westminster Assembly: Reading its Theology in Historical Context (pages 184-185)

If the target of the final clause is Molina’s Molinism, then the “knowledge of all future actions” refers to scientia media (middle knowledge). Consequently, the Confession opposes any view of the decree that includes God receiving knowledge about any contingency, including the free choices of men.

Comments on four commentaries:

The commentators will simply be referred to as C 1, 2, 3 and 4. Their works are widely known in Reformed circles and I see no purpose in drawing attention to the authors. My particular hope is to heighten awareness and foster further interest in a doctrine that should invoke our highest praise as it reflects God’s matchless glory. To that end, I believe due attention should be given to how far we have drifted from our theological predecessors, assuming C4 is an adequate reflection of contemporary thinking among those who profess to be Reformed.

Unfortunately, I believe certain teachings must be addressed with critical precision. It’s in that spirit I proceed without pleasure, other than with the hope that this exercise might bear fruit.

Commentator 1:

Out of the blocks, C1 equated the divine decree with God’s determination of things that will occur. “By the decree of God is meant his purpose or determination with respect to future things.” In other words, C1 was a theological determinist. Which is to say, God does not merely permit the free choices of men. Rather, God determines their outcomes independently of the creature. “If God be an independent being, all creatures must have an entire dependence upon him…”

Secondly, C1 recognized that had God not determined all that would come to pass, God could not foreknow the future as certain. For C1, God’s exhaustive omniscience is predicated upon his sovereign and independent determination of would-counterfactuals including the actual future free acts of men. “God could not foreknow that things would be, unless he had decreed they should be…” For C1, if it were otherwise the case, there could be no surety of outcome. “…for if they had not been determined upon, they could not have been foreknown as certain.”

Thirdly, C1 believed man has free will when he “acts without any constraint, and according to his own free choice…” Consequently, and lastly, C1 was a compatibilist. C1 believed man’s free choices are compatible with God’s determination of them: “that the divine decree…while it secures the futurition of events, it leaves rational agents to act as freely as if there had been no decree….” As a compatibilist, C1 rejected an indeterminist view of freedom, which entails a philosophy of freedom that grounds contingency in the creature as opposed to in God’s free determination. In other words, C1 rejected that a choice that would occur might not occur because of indeterminate creaturely freedom: “the execution of the decree of God is not suspended upon any condition which may or may not be performed.”

Commentator 2:

C2 took things to another level by expounding more deeply on the points he had in common with C1. Like C1, C2 mapped the certainty of future events to the sovereign determination of them: “while at the same time, [the decree] makes the entire system of events, and every element embraced in it, certainly future.”

Secondly, C2 understood that for God to know that an event would occur, God must causally determine the event to ensure its future outcome. “But the all-comprehensive purpose of God embraces and determines the cause and the conditions, as well as the event suspended upon them…Calvinists affirm that he foresees them to be certainly future because he has determined them to be so.”

Thirdly, C2 specifically argued that God determines the relationship of cause to effect. In other words, for C2, it is the decree of God that makes even contingent events contingent! “The decree, instead of altering, determines the nature of events, and their mutual relations. It makes free actions free in relation to their agents, and contingent events contingent in relation to their conditions.” (In contemporary philosophical parlance, there are no brute facts. God pre-interprets the particulars and wills their relationship of cause and effect.)

Lastly, because C2 understood that man acts freely, C2 believed freedom is compatible with the robust determinism he avowed. “Now, that a given free action is certainly future, is obviously not inconsistent with the perfect freedom of the agent in that act: Because all admit that God certainly foreknows the free actions of free agents, and if so, they must be certainly future, although free…”

Commentary 3:

In an economy of words, C3 taught “that God has predetermined all things that happen.” C3 understood that God’s sovereign determination of choices does not destroy genuine freedom. For C3, “The free actions of men are also predestined by God. Please note: these acts are both free and predestined…” And as his predecessors from the century before, C3 grounded God’s foreknowledge of future contingencies in the sovereign determination of God. “God knows that a thing is certain to happen before it happens, we may then ask, what makes it certain? There can be but one answer: God makes it certain. We are unable to escape the conclusion that God foresees with certainty only because he guarantees with certainty.”

Like those who preceded him in the tradition, C3 was a theological determinist and compatibilist, which is to say he affirmed free will while denying indeterminism and, consequently, the ability to choose otherwise (libertarian freedom).

All 3 commentators:

These pastors and theologians based the certainty of God’s exhaustive omniscience upon the guarantees afforded to him by a deterministic decree. They did not yield an inch to the idea that God knows what men will do because of a supposed middle knowledge that is logically prior to his creative decree. When one reads these men, the most striking feature is their unwavering conviction that divine determinism is at the heart of the divine decree. Without it, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for them to have portrayed the Reformed view of the divine decree. Determines or predetermines is throughout each of the expositions of 3.2. One commentary included seventeen references to a form of the word determine in his exposition along with a couple of synonyms! Ironically, divine determinism is rarely mentioned anymore in Reformed circles today unless it’s being questioned or denied.

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