The purpose of this critique is not to show that the classical view is wrong. It is to point out deficiencies in the reasoning of the position paper to prove the classical view. The aim is not to establish either the classical view or the modified view of impassibility as the correct one, but to sharpen those on both sides of the issue as they seek to better articulate a biblical view of the impassibility of God.

A Brief Critique of Reformed Baptist Churches of America’s Position Paper: Concerning the Doctrine of Divine Impassibility[1]

The Association of Reformed Baptist Churches of America (ARBCA) is an association of churches that hold to the Second London Baptist Confession of 1677/1689 (abbreviated hereafter as 2LCF). In order to clarify their understanding of the Confession that God is “without … passions,”[2] the Theological Committee of ARBCA drafted a position paper, to which all ARBCA churches must affirm.

The position taken is in this position paper is that “God does not experience emotional changes either from within or effected by his relationship to creation. He is not changed from within or without; he remains unchanged and unchanging both prior and subsequent to creation.”[3] This view is known as the classical view of divine impassibility.

In contrast, the position paper describes the position it opposes as follows: “God … displays a full array of emotions which are subject to change according to his sovereign will … God undergoes change in relation to the created order, just not involuntarily … while God expresses an array of divine emotions, he is affirmed to be in some sense impassible.”[4] This view is known as the modified view of divine impassibility.

What follows is a brief critique of this position paper. It is brief in that it is not a comprehensive critique of the entire position paper, but only of some of the affirmations made in the paper. Also, the purpose of this critique is not to affirm or deny either the classical view or the modified view. Rather, the purpose is to critique the arguments in the position paper used to defend the classical view. It is intended to edify and sharpen those on both sides of the issue such that they can better understand and articulate a biblical view of the doctrine of divine impassibility.

Affirmation #17: God’s Perfection and Emotional Change

One of the objections to God experiencing emotional changes raised in the position paper is that emotional changes would undermine God’s perfection. This is summarized in #17 of the affirmation and denials.

17. We affirm that all of God’s affections are infinite in perfection. Therefore, if God were to undergo an emotional change, that change would be either for the better or the worse. If for the better, then he must not have been infinite in perfection prior to the change, and therefore was not God. If for the worse, then he would no longer be infinite in perfection after the change, and therefore no longer God.[5]

The logic goes like this: the position paper supposes, for the sake of argument, that God undergoes emotional change. Supposing this, according to the argument, necessarily leads to denying God’s perfection, either before or after the emotional change. This conclusion is unacceptable, and therefore, the supposition that God has emotional changes must be false. What the argument boils down to is that emotional change is incompatible with perfection.

On this point, the position paper cites Turretin, who writes in Institutes of Elenctic Theology, “He can neither be changed for the better (because he is the best) nor for the worse (because he would cease to be the most perfect).”[6] Turretin himself cites Augustine: “Whatsoever is changed from the better for the worse, and from the worse for the better, is not God, because perfect virtue can neither change for the better, nor true eternity for the worse.”[7]

However, it is important to note that, in context, neither Turretin nor Augustine are specifically addressing emotional change, or asserting that an emotional change in God would be for the better or for the worse, as the position paper asserts. They are simply saying God cannot be changed for the better or for the worse, which is something that both classical and modified views of divine impassibility agree on.

The position paper says that if God experienced emotional changes, it would have to be for 1) the better, or 2) the worse, which are both unacceptable options. But to prove that God does not experience emotional changes, the argument depends on these being the only two possible options.

In logic, there is a fallacy called the “false dilemma.” In this fallacy, only a few options are presented when actual the number of possibilities is greater than that. What is missing in this scenario is the possibility that God experienced emotional changes that were for 3) neither better nor worse. If 3) is a viable option, then the position paper is presenting a false dilemma.

Another problem with this argument is that emotional changes and perfection are not necessarily incompatible. We can see this in the person of Jesus, who both experienced emotional changes, and was and is perfect. The position paper notes that Jesus did suffer in his humanity, and experienced changing emotions, citing Gregory of Nazianzen to say that Jesus was “passible in his flesh, and impassible in his godhead.”[8]

To be sure, Jesus’ humanity and his divinity do not share all the same properties. Thus, Jesus’ changing emotions in his humanity does not necessarily mean that he has changing emotions in his divinity. However, both his human nature and his divine nature share the property of perfection. The confessions describe Jesus’ two natures as “two whole, perfect, and distinct natures … were inseparably joined together in one person.”[9]

Jesus was perfect in both his divinity and humanity. So, if Jesus’ human affections are “infinite in perfection,” and he underwent emotional changes, we can ask this question: would Jesus’ emotional changes be for 1) the better, or 2) the worse?

At this point, it must readily be acknowledged that neither of these options are viable. Jesus experienced emotional change, but this did not affect his perfection. Emotional changes and perfection are compatible. But if we affirm both emotional changes and perfection in the humanity of Jesus, we must say that Jesus experienced emotional change that was neither for the better nor for the worse.

Therefore, emotional change does not necessarily entail a change for better or for worse. Emotional change does not necessarily impinge on perfection. Thus, we need to consider option 3, God experienced emotional changes that were for neither the better or the worse, as a viable option.

In considering the hypothetical situation, affirmation #17 of the position paper is not considering all the possibilities of the hypothesis. This is the logical fallacy of the false dilemma. Therefore, it does not logically show that the hypothesis is unacceptable, and cannot prove by this argument that God cannot undergo emotional change.

In order to address this logical fallacy, the case where God has emotional changes that are not for better nor for worse needs to be considered. After consideration, this possibility can be either allowed for, or it can be refuted, but it cannot be left unaccounted for.

Affirmation #3: The Analogy of Scripture and Prioritizing Ontological Statements

Hermeneutics is a technical word for the study of interpretation, usually the interpretation the Bible. One of the pillars of biblical interpretation is that Scripture interprets Scripture. This is articulated in the Westminster Confession of Faith and the London Baptist Confession of 1689 as follows:

The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: And therefore when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold but one) it must be searched by other places that speak more clearly.[10]

The reasoning beyond this principle of interpretation is that Scripture is consistent in what it affirms, and does not contradict itself. Thus, we can use other passages of Scripture to help interpret other passages. When a passage of Scripture is difficult, unclear, or uncertain, we can use other passages of Scripture to help interpret that passage. This hermeneutical principle is called the “analogy of Scripture.” The position paper affirms this principle in #1 and #2 of the affirmations and denials.

The position paper builds upon the analogy of scripture in #3 of its affirmation and denials.

3. We affirm that passages which speak of God’s being and essence must be given interpretive priority, not only because they are the less difficult and ambiguous, but also because what God is precedes what he is like toward us. The latter must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the former. We deny that passages which posit divine passions (i.e., what he is like toward us) take priority over passages which speak of God’s being and essence (i.e., what he is).

The analogy of scripture simply says that the clear passages should take priority over the difficult and ambiguous passages. The position paper takes a step further and says which passages are clear, and which ones are difficult and ambiguous. The ones that describe God’s being and essence, which are called “ontological,” are the clear ones. The ones describing what God is like towards us, including those describing God emotionally, are the difficult and ambiguous ones that must be interpreted by the ontological passages.

It is important to note that neither the Westminster Confession of Faith nor the London Baptist Confession of 1689 make the assertion that the ontological passages are to be given interpretive priority. They only assert that the clear passages should be prioritized, and unlike the position paper, they do not say which passages are clear and which are not.

By this reasoning, it naturally follows that God does not experience emotional changes. The foundational hermeneutic is that passages describing emotional changes are difficult and ambiguous, and do not take priority, and that the passages describing God as impassible and immutable are clear and unambiguous. This conclusion follows from its hermeneutical presuppositions.

But where does this hermeneutical principle come from? And is it biblical? While the analogy of scripture is found in the confessions, and well-known among biblical interpreters today, the priority of ontological statements is not. The position paper does not footnote the source of this particular hermeneutical principle, nor is it found in any standard works on hermeneutics. So, where did this hermeneutic come from? Was it a hermeneutic articulated in the past, which has since been overlooked? Or is it a more recent formulation, perhaps derived from how others prioritized ontological statements, but never articulated as a hermeneutical principle until recently? Are there other works describe the priority of ontology based on the analogy of scripture?

Richard Barcellos believes that the position paper advocates nothing new, but is following an established hermeneutic dating from the early church. Barcellos is a member of the ARBCA Theological Committee, which produced the position paper, and he is Associate Professor of Biblical Studies at IRBS Theological Seminary, the official seminary of ARBCA. He writes:

As I studied the seventeenth-century theologians’ theological method and hermeneutic, I found that it was not novel; they leaned and built upon the Reformers and the entire Christian theological tradition back to the early fathers. This is certainly the case with their doctrine of God as well. Their view of impassibility has a long history. It can be found in the early fathers and the medieval theologians.

The Association of Reformed Baptist Churches of America commissioned its Theology Committee to provide a position paper on this issue … This document advocates nothing new; it simply seeks to explicate what classical Christian theism taught and teaches on divine impassibility.[11]

Now, it is true many interpreters of the past have held to the classical view of divine impassibility. Anyone who holds that view would, in practice, prioritize the passages that speak of God’s impassibility over the passages that speak of God emotionally.

But, the question is, how did they justify prioritizing ontology? Did any of them formulate a hermeneutic that prioritized ontology based on the analogy of scripture, as the position paper does?

In a public online forum, Barcellos cites Mark Sheridan’s book as an example of the position paper’s hermeneutic.

Zach H. Hicks said, “You can see that in the ARBCA’s weird ‘hermeneutic’ rule where they say that ontological descriptions always take priority over relational descriptions.” That “weird” hermeneutic is older than ARBCA. Cf. Mark Sheridan, Language for God in Patristic Tradition, IVP, 2015. E.g., “The ancient commentators … interpreted the Scriptures in the light of their understanding of the nature of God” (19). Chapter one seeks to prove this.[12]

Thus, Barcellos believes that this hermeneutical principle actually goes back to at least the patristic tradition, and that Sheridan’s book affirms this.

However, in that book, Sheridan does not mention the analogy of scripture as the reason the ancient commentators prioritized God’s ontology, so it falls short as an example of affirming the hermeneutical principle in affirmation #3 of the position paper.

Also, Sheridan makes it clear on the next page that “their understanding of the nature of God,” which Barcellos quotes, is not simply the ontological statements in Scripture. Both Scripture and Greek philosophy were sources for their understanding of the nature of God.

The notion of “theological interpretation” should be understood here then as the search for the correct understanding of the biblical texts by the major early Christian writers, especially those in the Greek and Latin traditions. The principle tool used in this search was an understanding of God, of the divine nature, derived in part from the Greek philosophical tradition, particularly the exclusion from the divine nature of anthropomorphic (in human form) and anthropopathic (with human passions) traits, but also informed by the understanding of God as revealed by Jesus Christ, a chief aspect of which was the divine love for humankind (philanthrōpia). What did not conform to these essential traits had to be excluded from (or distinguished from) the “true” meaning of Scripture, and the text had to be interpreted so as to provide a meaning that both conformed to or was fitting to the divine nature and was useful.[13]

Thus, according to Sheridan, the patristic tradition did not come to its position on divine impassibility based on the analogy of scripture. Instead, they used both Scripture and Greek philosophy to understand the nature of God, an in particular used Greek philosophy when it came to the doctrine of impassibility.

This patristic hermeneutic that Sheridan describes actually contradicts denial #23 of the position paper.

We deny that the classical DDI as expressed by the 2LCF 2.1 is a scholastic dogma founded in philosophical and metaphysical speculation based on natural theology.[14]

So, we are back to same question again: where does the hermeneutic of affirmation #3 come from? It is not found in any standard works on hermeneutics, there are no citations for it in the position paper, and one of the authors, when addressing it, was not able to produce any primary sources for it. The secondary source presented did not support affirmation #3, but rather contradicted the position paper regarding how the early church derived the doctrine of impassibility.

If the authors of the position paper want to sustain their claim that there is nothing new advocated in the position paper, they need to properly cite historical sources that articulate the same hermeneutical principle found in affirmation #3.

Affirmation #3 and the Love of God

Affirmation #3 says that the passages about God’s being and essence take priority for two reasons: 1) because they are less difficult and ambiguous, and 2) what God is precedes what God is like towards us.

It does not seem clear to me that passages about God’s being and essence are easier and unambiguous. Let us consider the doctrine of God’s love. The ontological statement is “God is love” (1 John 4:18, ESV). The statement, though, is ambiguous as to what it means. Does God love everybody? Does God only love some people? Does God love conditionally, or unconditionally? If God is love, could he act in a hateful manner towards some people?

Perhaps the most common reason for a person to reject the traditional view on hell is by prioritizing “God is love” over statements about how God acts towards humanity in sending people to hell. For example, Rob Bell asks in his book Love Wins, “Has God created millions of people over tens of thousands of years who are going to spend eternity in anguish? Can God do this, or even allow this, and still claim to be a loving God?”[15]

The problem is that the ontological statement about love is vague and not very well-defined, and thus prone to misuse and distortion. Other Scripture passages on God’s love are necessary to put proper borders on our understanding of God as love.

For example, consider this statement of how God is towards us: “But God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us” (Romans 5:8, ESV). This statement puts meat on the ontological statement of God’s love. God demonstrated his love by sending his son Jesus to die for his people. It is neither difficult nor ambiguous. In addition, it helps us understand what 1 John 4:18 means when it says “God is love.” When you interpret the statement about God’s being with the statement about God’s actions, the ontological statement is actually made clearer and less ambiguous.

Affirmation #3 and Impassibility

In the same way that we need to be careful with ontological statements like “God is love,” we also need to be cautious about using ontological statements about the unchanging nature of God.

The position paper uses five ontological passages to prove the classical view of divine impassibility. They are:

1. The false prophet Balaam’s statement: “God is not man, that he should lie, or a son of man, that he should change his mind. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it?” (Numbers 23:19, ESV).
2. Samuel’s statement: “And also the Glory of Israel will not lie or have regret, for he is not a man, that he should have regret” (1 Samuel 15:29, ESV).
3. Malachi’s statement: “For I, the LORD, do not change; therefore you, O sons of Jacob, are not consumed” (Mal. 3:6, ESV).
4. Barnabas and Paul’s words: “Men, why are you doing these things? We also are men with the same nature as you, and preach to you that you should turn from these useless things to the living God, who made heaven, the earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.” (Acts 14:15, ESV).
5. James’ statement: “Every good thing given and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shifting shadow” (James 1:17, ESV).

First, let’s consider the passages in Numbers and in 1 Samuel. Both say that God does not lie. Within these contexts, it means that God fulfills what he says he will do. But does it mean that God never deceives? Some argue that based on this passage, but we know in 2 Thessalonians 2:11 that God sends a delusion to some people so that they will believe what is false. Statements about how God acts towards us can help us to define the ontological statements better.

Now, let’s consider the passage in Malachi. God says that he does not change. His nature is unchanging, or immutable.

Does that mean that God does not change in any respect? For example, if you were to ask a Jew or a Muslim whether God could become a man, they would be quick to deny it. For them, an unchanging God means that God could not become a man. But for the Christian, this is a foundational belief.

The position paper thus clarifies, “Though the Son of God became flesh (John 1:14), he never ceased being what he always was and ever shall be … The incarnation wrought no change in the Word’s deity.”[16] In other words, based on John 1:14, the incarnation is not considered a change in God.

But if we were simply to prioritize the statement “God does not change,” we would not know for sure if the incarnation would be considered a violation of Malachi 3:6, John 1:14, Philippians 2:5-8, and other passages on the incarnation clarify that taking on flesh does not violate God’s unchanging nature. So we ought to have some restraint when we apply God’s unchanging nature to concepts beyond the context of the passage.

Within the context of Malachi, God’s unchanging nature is referring to his faithfulness to preserve the covenant people of Israel. We understand God’s unchanging nature because of how God acts towards us in preserving the people of Israel. Again, the statement describing how God is like towards us is clearer than the statement describing God ontologically.

So we can apply God’s unchanging nature to God’s faithfulness to his promises, but we cannot apply it towards the incarnation. So how broadly can we apply God’s unchanging nature? Does that ontological statement mean that God does not have emotional changes? The passage simply is not clear enough to decide for sure. This lack of clarity can apply to all five of the passages above. The contexts simply do not say whether emotional changes are in view.

Passages about God’s being and essence are not always less difficult and ambiguous than statements about what God is like towards us. Often, ontological statements are vague and unclear, and statements about what God is like towards us can help us understand and draw proper boundaries about what the ontological statements mean.

Ontological statements can be either easy or difficult, clear or ambiguous. They should not take priority simply because they are ontological statements. The same is true regarding passages that speak about what God is like towards us. Each passage should be evaluated on its own merits, and not by a hermeneutical principle that presupposes clarity or ambiguity.

Conclusion

The ARBCA Position Paper on Divine Impassibility presents the classical view of divine impassibility. In making the case for it, the position paper argues in affirmation #17 that an emotional change in God would necessarily be for better or worse, and thus compromise God’s perfection. However, in considering emotional change in God, it excludes the possibility of emotional change that would be neither for the better or the worse. Thus, affirmation #17 does not logically prove that God cannot have an emotional change.

The position paper also presents a hermeneutical principle in affirmation #3 that says that passages that speak of God’s being and essence should take priority because they are less difficult and ambiguous. I have been unable to find any historical precedence for this hermeneutical principle. A closer look at passages regarding love and impassibility show that ontological propositions are not always clear, and can be prone to misunderstanding. Those passages should not take priority simply by virtue of being ontological.

The purpose of this critique is not to show that the classical view is wrong. It is to point out deficiencies in the reasoning of the position paper to prove the classical view. The aim is not to establish either the classical view or the modified view of impassibility as the correct one, but to sharpen those on both sides of the issue as they seek to better articulate a biblical view of the impassibility of God.

Donald Lowe is a church planter in Southeast Asia with World Team. He holds an M.S. in Electrical Engineering, an M.A. in Theology from Fuller Theological Seminary, and a Certificate in Applied Linguistics from the Graduate Institute of Applied Linguistics.

[1] Theological Committee of the Association of Reformed Baptist Churches of America, “A Position Paper Concerning the Doctrine of Divine Impassibility”

[2] 2LCF 2.1.

[3] ARBCA TC, 1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid, 28.

[6] Ibid, 5, quoting Turretin, Institutes, 1:205.

[7] Turretin, Institutes, 1:205, citing Tractate 23*, On the Gospel of John [NPNF1, 7:154; PL 35.1588].

[8] Ibid, 21, quoting Schaff, NPNF, 7:439.

[9] WCF/2LCF 8.2.

[10] WCF/2LCF 1.9.

[11] Richard Barcellos, “My Journey in the Doctrine of Divine Impassibility,” The Log College, May 2, 2015,  https://thelogcollege.wordpress.com/2015/05/02/my-journey-in-the-doctrine-of-divine-impassibility/.

[12] Richard Barcellos, A 1689 Confession Fellowship Group, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/groups/1689fellowship/permalink/689646304496229/?comment_id=692678090859717.

[13] Mark Sheridan, Language for God in Patristic Tradition: Wrestling with Biblical Anthropomorphism, 20.

[14] ARBCA TC, 28.

[15] Rob Bell, Love Wins, 2.

[16] Ibid, 12.